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EDITORIAL 
In continuation of a student project initiated in the 
Spring of 1969, the Editorial Staff of the MANAGEMENT QUARTERLY 
is pleased to present to its readers a sampling of course 
papers written by students at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
The papers were selected for their excellence in terms of 
broad-based appeal, readability and informative value. 
We wish to thank all the faculty for their cooperation 
and assistance in identifying papers for possible inclusion 
in the MANAGEMENT QUARTERLY. Succeeding editorial staffs 
will continue to consider for publication all student papers 
submitted from every education and research department of 
the Naval Postgraduate School. It is the editors' opinion 
that this policy provides an opportunity for the broad spec-
trum of efforts at the School to be recognized and shared 
by an expanded audience of the future leaders of the 
U.S. Navy. 
In order to ensure a continuous input of student papers 
to the editorial staff, a Student Mail Center box (SMC-1499) 
has been designated for MANAGEMENT QUARTERLY use on a perma-
nent basis. Submission by faculty members of suitable mid-
term papers, research work and term project reports will be 
accepted at any time. We also believe that this Journal 
offers students the unique opportunity to have their research 
efforts recognized. We invite those students who feel that 
their recent academic efforts might be of interest to others 
to also forward a copy to SMC-1499. 
THE EDITOR 
The views expressed in the MANAGEMENT QUARTERLY are those of 
the authors exclusively, and in no way reflect the attitude or 
endorsement of the Department of Defense, the Navy Department 
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INTRODUCTION 
Work is performed in the Department of Defense (DOD) 
basically in two ways--"in-house" with military and civilian 
personnel, or "out of house" by contract. Which way it is 
done is based on policy, practicality, and law. Office of 
Management & Budget (0MB) circular A-76 states that it is 
the national policy of DOD and each Federal agency to rely 
on the private sector for goods and services it needs to the 
maximum extent consistent with effective accomplishment of 
essential programs. Exceptions to this policy include 
economy, national defense readiness, security, and those 
basic functions of management which agencies must perform in 
order to retain essential control over the conduct of their 
programs including those management advisory services nor-
mally provided by the government staff organizations. 
This paper addresses contracting out for support services--
as opposed to contracting out for a finished product or end 
item--and differentiates between three basic support services 
categories in DOD: Expert and Consultant Services (personal 
services), Contract Support Services (nonpersonal services) 
and Commercial or Industrial (C/I) support services (nonper-
sonal services). Attention will then be directed to proper 
use of contractor personnel, the difference between personal 
and nonpersonal services, and the factors arising during 
contract administration which may render otherwise proper 
contracts illegal. 
SUPPORT CATEGORIES 
In DOD and the Navy, support services can be categorized 
as follows: 
Expert and Consultant Services (personal services). These 






PERSONAL VERSUS NON•PERSONAL SERVICES 
by 
Jonathan J. Hein 
ABSTRACT 
One way for a manager to "get the job done" is to controct with private 
industry. However, as the author describes, there are subtle legal and 
procedurol implications which can tum a simple idea into a difficult 
situation. A basic knowledge of the distinction between the personal 
versus non-personal types of service contracts is necessary prior to 
making the decision to look to industry to help. 
This article was prepared for Professor J. W. Creighton in partial fulfillment 
of the course objectives for Labor Law (MN-4225). 
--------------------------
LCDR. Jonathan J. Hein received a Bachelor of Science degree in Economics 
from Tulane University in 1969 and, in 1978 was awarded a Master of 
Science in Public Administration from the University of Northern Colorado . 
He has also been awarded a Master of Science degree in Acquisition Contract 




exceptionally qualified, by education or by experience, in 
a particular field to perform some specialized service. As 
set forth in the Navy Procurement Directives, such services 
are procured through the Office of Civilian Personnel in 
accordance with the Federal Personnel Manual. 
Contractor Support Services (nonpersonal services). These 
are support services of a white collar, professional nature, 
involving performance in support of Navy programs, such as 
scientific/technical studies and analyses; test and evalua-
tion support; reliability and maintainability support; 
integrated logistics support; budgetary/financial analysis; 
cost analysis; data/configuration management support; ADP 
support; and general management support . Contractor support 
services are procured in accordance with normal Navy procure-
ment procedures. 
Commercial or Industrial (C/I) Activities Support Services 
(nonpersonal services). These are overhead or program support 
services which are not essential to the management control 
of Navy programs. While the major thrust of this effort is 
in the blue collar area, such as janitorial, transportation, 
or guard services, C/I services can involve effort similar 
to that described above as contractor support services. 
C/I services are procured in accordance with normal Navy 
procurement procedures as modified Chief of Naval Material 
Notice 4860 of 21 Dec 1976, and the revised 0MB circular A-76 
which established the requirement for the use of the Firm 
Bid/Offer procedure for procurements in support of the C/I 
Activities Program. Also required is an independent audit 
on the Government's bid by the Naval Audit Service. 
The major difference between contractor support services 
and C/I services is that the C/I Activities Program calls 
for the contracting out of entire functions, i.e., the trans-
fer of a total capability from in-house to out-house by 
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contract; while contractor support services involve the con-
tracting out of specific effort, or tasks, in support of a 
continuing in-house capability, i.e., the management and 
control of a specific Navy program . For example, in the ADP 
area, the contracting out of the enti r e ADP capability of a 
Navy activity (operation, maintenance, programming, etc.) 
would fall under the C/I Activities Prog r am. The contracting 
out of a specific effort to develop ADP software in support 
of a particular Navy Program Manager or Function/Technical 
Code would be classified as contractor support services and 
not fall under the C/I Activities Program. 
LIMITATIONS 
Let us assume that the decision ha s been made to let a 
contract involving services. Our conce r n now is that we make 
the contract properly and use the services properly. It is 
perfectly proper for the Government to purchase by contract 
what may be described as a finished pro duct--a piece of 
hardware, a defined piece of research, or a report . The 
Government may not contract out for the services of people 
who receive their assignments from Government personnel, 
work under the direct supervision of Government personnel, 
and whose relationship to the Government is thus no differ -
ent from that of a Government employee. If the Government 
desires to procure services in this fashion, it must hire the 
people directly, in accordance with Civil Service Laws. 
A finished product versus personal services--these form 
two ends of the spectrum. The finished product may be pro-
cured by contract, the personal services cannot. However, 
in between are situations where the Government does not want 
to hire people, yet the work it needs to have performed is 
essentially labor--painting a building, performing a study, 






situations, the Government may still obtain the work by 
contract providing two conditions are met: 
(1) The contract itself must contain a statement of 
working, asking or describing the finished product, the task 
to be performed or the level of effort required to perform 
the task. 
(2) The contract must be administered in such a way 
that control and supervision over the work and discretion 
as to the techniques used remain solely with the contractor--
in short, surveillance is OK, supervision is not. 
For example, if the Government wants a building painted, 
it defines the job, lets the contractor perform, and then 
accepts or rejects the finished product solely on the basis 
of whether the completed job meets the contract specifications. 
This would be a perfectly legal service contract. If, on 
the other hand, the Government directed and supervised the 
contractor's painters as it would its own military personnel 
or civilian employees, then the contract would be for per-
sonal services and would be illegal. In this latter case, 
the government would be in effect, hiring employees without 
regard to the Civil Service System. This the Government 
cannot do, and that is the reason all service contracts must 
provide for a clearly defined task in the statement of work. 
THE PROBLEM 
A contract may thus cross over into the forbidden area 
of personal services either the way it is written or the way 
it is administered. The former seldom occurs. The Defense 
Acquisition Regulation (DAR) provides adequate guidance and 
procedures that will insure that every services contract is 
at least legal on its face . The problem lies with the admin-
istration of these contracts--even the best written contracts 
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may be later ruled to be illegal if it is administered in-
correctly. How then can the illegal personal services 
problems be avoided? We will discuss Pre-Contract planning, 
the Contract itself, and Contract Administration in order to 
address this question. 
PRE-CONTRACT PLANNING 
In planning the contract, the Contracting Officer must 
receive cooperation from the users and technical personnel. 
Under the DAR, before the Contracting Officer may enter into 
a service contract, he must make a written determination 
that services are nonpersonal. To do so, he must rely almost 
completely on the users for the facts he needs. As a first 
step, the technical personnel must be educated in basic 
contract principles. He is a team member of the contracting 
function. The earlier the Contracting Officer receives the 
requirement, the better the contracting officer can do his 
job. The Contracting Officer must know the whole story--all 
the circumstances of what the services are to be provided 
and how they will be used. Too often a Contracting Officer 
may be forced into a sole source situation--the only source 
known to the technical personnel--because the time require-
ment does not permit competing the services contract. The 
Contracting Officer is responsible for making the procure-
ment and he requires the cooperation, expertise, and candor 
of the users. 
Second, the users must provide the contracting officer 
with a detailed description of the job they want done. This 
Statement of Work (SOW) describes the end item, task to be 
performed, or the level of effort to be exerted in the per-
formance of the task or job. The SOW should be comprehensive 
enough so that the contractor can perform with a minimum 






the revised 0MB A-76, the emphasis is on the SOW. Under the 
revised C/I service contracts, a Cost Comparison Handbook 
is used for all government bids under the firm bid rule. In 
nonpersonal services contracting, an incomplete SOW may lead 
to unintentional "buying in" because the contractor may not 
fully comprehend the extent of the government's requirement. 
The government usually finds this out during administration 
of the contract - -or when the final task or level of effort 
is delivered below the governments expection (and require-
ment!). 
Thirdly, there must be a review of all the collateral 
circumstances which might have a bearing upon whether an 
illegal personal services contract has been created. Although 
the major factor is the degree to which the government exer-
cises control and supervision over the performance of the 
contract, the Civil Service Commission's opinion, as well as 
ruling of the Comptroller General, and Procurement Management 
Reviews (PMR's), also look to related circumstances which, 
by their very nature, go hand in hand with the exercise of 
Government control over contractor performance. 
An example might be a contract under which the contrac-
tor was provided with articles of Government property . While 
it is not unusual for the Government to furnish equipment or 
material for use in the performance of its contracts, what 
is furnished is specialized (special tooling, special test 
equipment) or otherwise difficult for the contractor to pro-
vide himself. If, instead, the government furnishes something 
ordinary like office equipment, drafting tables, or typing 
paper--the kinds of items any employer ordinarily provides 
his own employees-then if unexplained, an inference may be 
drawn that the Government is treating the contractor's em-
ployees as its own. 
Similarly, civilian or military personnel generally work 
on-site, whereas a contractor's employees usually do not. 
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Thus, providing the contractor with office space or ship 
space at a government location might lend weight to an infer-
ence that his employees are, in effect, Government employees. 
By the same token, the work should be planned to avoid a mix 
of Government and contractor personnel, so that they are not 
working side-by-side, under similar conditions and supervis-
ion. This becomes a real challenge to the Contracting Office 
and Administrating Contracting Office (ACO) when the work or 
study must be performed in - house (for example, a study or 
evaluation on a test performed at a Navy Lab, software support 
for integrated ongoing computer systems, or company represen-
tatives aboard a ship maintaining an advanced radar or fire 
control system). Even when contractor personnel are physi-
cally separated from Government personnel, personal services 
may be found--if both were performing the same work and were 
otherwise interchangeable. And personal services have even 
been found in incentive and award fee contracts where the 
evaluation of contract performance was made, not upon the 
whole job, but rather on separate performance of individual 
contractor employees. But where does one draw the line? 
How can you evaluate contractor performance when that per-
formance may well be how the individual(s) under the services 
contract perform(s)? It is questions such as these that make 
the subject of nonpersonal services a vast legal battleground. 
In the planning stage, then, requirements, technical, 
and contracting people should pursue every effort toward 
elimination of as many such factors that could lead to an 
illegal personal services contract as they can. None of them 
alone would necessarily be fatal to the contract's legality 
and some of them might be absolutely necessary. If these 
are carefully considered during the planning stage, and if 
there are good reasons for providing the contractor with 
tools, or working space, or doing anything else which might 







can provide for them, and later be administered, in a manner 
which will be proper and will not be susceptible to drawing 
an inference of personal services later on. 
THE CONTRACT 
The sort of planning described above should provide the 
Contracting Officer and his staff with all they need to know 
about actual requirements, in order to reduce them to clearly 
defined SOW's (the importance of which has been repeatedly 
stressed). 
The contract must avoid creating in the Government a 
specific or even implicit power to hire or fire contractor's 
employees. It is permissable to retain the authority to re-
quire security clearances or specify a certain level of 
expertise (i.e., BS in Mechanical Engineering, 2 years expe r-
ience in related field) to be utilized in the evaluation 
criteria of the contract award, but it must not go beyond 
that. For example, it is improper to provide an elaborate 
organization in the contract for the transmi s sion of work 
assignments on a supervisory level if, in practice, it is to 
be phoned from a Government draftsman to his contractor 
counterpart. To repeat what was stated earlier, writing a 
legal contract is not the end of the road. The heart of most 
personal services cases has been contract administration--
what actually happened--notwithstanding the comprehensiveness 
and correctness of the written contract terms. 
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION 
What then are the pitfalls of contract administration? 
Essentially, the Government must keep "hands off" the con-
tractor's employees during the course of contract operations, 
in order to avoid sliding into the area of supervision and 
control . This does not mean that, after the contract is 
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signed, there can be no further contact with the contractor 
or his staff. In the course of almost any contract perfor-
mance, there must be some dialogue between both sides. 
Complete insulation from one another is as unnecessary as it 
is undes i rable. Also, it may be noted, that the Defense 
Contract Administration Service (DCAS) usually does not ad-
minister service contracts - -this is done by the Procuring 
Contracting Officer's (PCO) staff or the Contracting Officers 
Technical Representative (COTR). Thus, another challenge 
(or burden) is added to the already growing list of contract-
ing officer responsibilities. 
The permissable range of dialogue between the government's 
representatives and the contractor's representatives is what 
liaison, discussion, or explanation is necessary to carry 
out the traditional process of contract administration. 
Government in spectors and quality control personnel cannot 
do their work in a vacuum. It usually requires contact and 
communications to be useful, and this is entirely proper. 
Government personnel may also be utilized properly in a 
liaison capacity not only for surveillance and to keep the 
Contracting Officer apprised of progress, but also as a con-
tact point through whom the contractor can relay his questions 
or problems. Accordingly, the contract performance and 
delivery milestones are important, and insuring that they are 
met may demand prodding and reminding of many shapes and 
forms. In all proper administration functions, government 
representatives do not dictate what or how the contractor is 
to perform. The "what" is set out in the contractor's respon-
sibility. Proper contract administration should entail 
policing the written terms of the contract and assisting the 
contractor when necessary to ensure that the Government receives 
the job it has contracted for on time. 
Contract administration begins to run afoul when the 






of the contract. By telling the contractor WHAT to do, they 
may be subjecting the government to claims for changes (con-
structive changes). But by directing HOW to do it, they are 
crossing the line into a personal services situation. Then 
they are beginning to exercise supervision or control, tran-
scending the proper function of surveillance. Often, this 
arises from no more than a well-intentioned but overzealous 
desire upon the part of responsible government representa-
tives to achieve near perfection in the services obtained. 
Such noverzealousness" comes from the contractor himself 
by attempting to be responsive to the Navy organization with 
which he is working and initiating contacts (usually informal) 
which result in government control or supervision over the 
work being performed. In many nonpersonal services contracts 
by Small Business enterprises, the government must take them 
by the hand (in effect supervise the performance of the work) 
to preclude their nonperformance which could lead to a Ter-
mination for Default and Bankruptcy. This type of situation 
must be guarded against. 
In short, the contractor's employees should always be 
looking only to their own superiors for instructions, and 
they, in turn, must look back to the written terms of the 
contract. This chain of responsibility must exist throughout 
the performance of the contract. 
STATUTORY EXCEPTION 
From time to time it is desirable for the government to 
have precisely that sort of supervision and control which is 
generally improper, and where the short duration of work dic-
tates against hiring employees and the Civil Service Laws. 
Authority under 5 U.S.C. 3109 (DAR 22-201) may be used for 
the contracting out for the services of experts and consul-
tants on a temporary or intermittent basis. This authority 
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is very limited in scope and requires HPA (Higher Procuring 
Agency) approval. 
COURSE FOR THE FUTURE 
What direction are we heading? Does President Carter's 
Memo of 12 May 77 (expressing concern on the excessively 
large volume of personal and nonpersonal consulting and 
expert services used by the Federal Government) conflict with 
0MB A-76? I contend that they do not--but that the Presi-
dent's direction is toward that of tighter control. Contract-
ing out for nonpersonal services may be of great assistance 
to the Navy and other services achieving their goals but we 
must ensure that the Navy does not lose the corporate memory 
and expertise to retain essential management control of its 
programs. In the area of contractor support services, the 
Chief of Naval Material (CNM) has directed (by CNM ltr of 
22 Jul 76 and subsequent directives and instructions) each 
Systems Commander to develop internal control procedures that 
would: 
(1) Ensure high level review and approval (Commanding 
Officers in the case of field activities) of all requirements 
for contractor support services involving an aggregate obli-
gation in excess of $50,000. The purpose of this review is 
to ensure full consideration of all available resources and 
to ensure that the Navy's fundamental responsibility for 
controlling and managing its programs is not compromised or 
weakened through contracting out . This is further delineated 
by NAVMATINST 4200.50 of 30 Mar 77. But a dilemma has been 
created here--field activities are faced with the real prob-
lem of reduction in personnel ceiling (sometimes from 2-5% 
per year) . Some point is reached where some part of manage-






For example, the activity requires a 5-year plan. There 
are no personnel in-house to develop the plan so with approval 
of the Commanding Officer, it is contracted out. A sharp 
Philadelphia lawyer would defend this by saying that a 5-year 
plan is not "management"--it is only a tool used by manage-
•ment for decision making. Still, we are dealing with touchy 
areas. 
(2) Ensure a legal review of each proposed procurement 
of nonpersonal services in excess of $10,000. The purpose 
of this review is to ensure that the proposed procurement 
will result in a nonpersonal services effort. This Personal 
versus Nonpersonal Services Questionnaire also requires 
approval by a level higher than the Contracting Officer. 
The questionnaire is filled out by the requiring code and 
addresses many of the questions presented in this paper. 
"To what extent can the government obtain civil servants to 
do the job?" "Does the proposed contractor have specialized 
knowledge or equipment which is unavailable in the Govern-
ment?" The answer is in the affirmative, describe the spe-
cialized knowledge or equipment." 
"To what extent are contractor employees used interchangeably 
with Government to perform the same functions?" 
"To what extent does the Government retain the right to have 
contractor employees removed from the job for reasons other 
than misconduct or security?" 
CONCLUSION 
Nonpersonal services contracts are--for better or for 
worse--here to stay. Handled effectively, they can be a 
wise use of taxpayers dollars in the performance of DOD's 
mission and objectives. Their use, however, must be controlled 
to retain corporate in-house expertise within each service. 
TOTAL CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT: A PROJECT 
MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION 
by 
Nell S, Fox 
ABSTRACT 
Decisions as to the mnge and depth the military services will be 
involued in the shore based maintenance of their own equip-
ment are affected by many factors. The author presents an ob-
jectiue reuiew of some past efforts at contractor maintenance 
programs. With total military support personnel reductions likely 
to be maintained in the future, serious considerations of the 
contractor support option requires a broad base understanding 
of potential problems. 
This paper was prepared for CDR David V. Lamm, SC, USN, Professor, 
In _partial fulflUment of the course requirements for Project Management 
(AS-3501). 
CAPT. Nell s. Fox, USMC, was awarded his Bachelor of Science In Busi• 
ness Administration In 1972 from Pennsylvania State University. In 1980 








In April of 1977 the Navy received the first T-44 twin 
engined trainer of a planned 66 unit buy from Beech Aero 
Space Incorporated (BAS!). [11] The advent of the T-44 
ushered in a totally new concept in naval aviation: 
complete logistical support of naval aircraft at the organ-
izational level by civilian contract. 
The concept of contractural support is not new but 
total logistical support for aircraft at the organizational 
level is. The implementation of total contractor logistic 
support in the Navy is a direct result of project manage-
ment and more specifically the actions of the Assistant 
Project Manager for Logistics (APML) for PMA 271 [12] . 
It is the objective of this paper to give a brief 
background of contractor logistic support and to show how 
it has been integrated into the Naval logistics support 
system and the role project management has played in its 
implementation. In order to accomplish the objective, this 
paper will begin by laying a foundation for contractural 
logistics. Discussion will fall on where and why contract-
ural logistics has been applied. Advantages and disadvan-
tages of contract logistics will be pointed out and the 
feasibility examined. 
BACKGROUND 
Since 1952 the Department of Defense has had a formally 
promulgated policy to be applied by its components in 
determining whether products and services used by DOD are 
to be provided by private enterprise or by DOD itself, 
predating any such policy of other executive agencies of 
the federal government [8:11]. Three years after the 
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promulgation of DOD's policy the remaining agencies of 
the executive branch followed suit. Thus, for 25 years it 
has been the policy of the government to rely on the private 
sector of the economy for goods and services to the maximum 
extent possible. Promulgation of the Bureau of Budget 
(BOB} Bulletin 55-4 issued in 1955 stated that the govern-
ment would not start or carry on any commercial-industrial 
activity to provide a service or product for its own use 
if such a product or service could be procured from private 
enterprise through ordinary business channels. BOB bulletins 
57-7 April 1957 and 60-2 Sept. 1959 also emphasized the 
government's policy to rely on the private sector [1:13] . 
Although the BOB bulletins set forth the policy of federal 
reliance on the private sector, specifications of applica-
tion of the policy were deficient . The specifications for 
application were defined and outlined in Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (0MB} circular A-76. It is significant 
that no distinction is made between a product or a service 
(excluding personal services) in 0MB circular A-76, there-
fore aircraft servicing or maintenance can be considered 
the same as an off-the-shelf commodity. 
During the period 1973 through 197~ aircraft/aircraft 
engine repair, modification, and rebuilding preferred by 
contract services had more than doubled, but as late as 
1975 figures still showed that more than 400,000 military 
and civilian personnel in DOD were performing services 
ostensibly available from private enterprise [6:30). 
Nearly thirty years ago, the Army Air Corps was credited 
with taking the initiative to civilianize functions through 
the use of contract services. The Army commands were 
directed to retain only those base communications systems 
within the zone of interior required for training overseas 






operation and maintenance by commercial companies [8,1]. 
During World War II the Army Air Corps used civilian 
contract flying schools in the rapid expansion of their 
flight training program with excellent results. The Army 
to this day uses civilian contract maintenance and flying 
instruction in their flight training program. 
When the Air Force became a separate service in 1947 
its force in readiness was decreased substantially and a 
number of maintenance depots were deactivated. The end of 
World War II dictated the reduction in manpower and activity. 
In 1948, the Air Force faced its first real emergency, the 
Berlin Airlift. Rather than reactivate its maintenance 
depots the Air Force chose to contract maintenance for its 
aircraft to civilian contractors that were servicing the 
same aircraft [6:10]. This contracting of maintenance to 
civilian contractors satisfied the Air Force's increased 
demand for maintenance and helped generate employment in 
the civilian aviation community which was on the decline 
since the end of World War II. 
From 1947 until 1967 the Air Force contracted on a 
crisis basis:contracting for civilian services during the 
Korean conflict . In 1967 the Air Force initiated the first 
large scale maintenance requirements of civilian contractors 
for intermediate level maintenance. To replace the fleet 
of 15 year old propeller driven aircraft the Air Force 
contracted with McDonnal Douglas for the off-the-shelf 
model of the DC-9, with minor modifications. 
During contract negotiations the contractor began 
outlining the logistical support program on a conventional 
organic basis. When the determination of the level of 
supplies and cost began; the late LtGen. T. P. Gerrity, 
then Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems and Logistics quietly 
interrupted. "No," he said, and referring to the contractor 
he said, "You buy the supplies. You support it." [2:26]. 
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This was the first contract of its type. Under the 
C-9 contract, the Air Force performed flight line and on 
line maintenance while McDonnel Douglas performed or 
subcontracted all off aircraft maintenance including heavy 
checks, component repair and engine overhaul. The contrac-
tor also supplied all supply functions [2:22], Presently, 
the Air Force has 6 permanent contractor support programs; 
C-12, E-4, C-9A, T-43, U-18B and the UC-9C [7]. 
Like the Air Force, the Navy at the end of WW II was 
forced to cut back on its manpower. Initially the Navy 
began contracting out depot level maintenance for off-the-
shelf transport aircraft. One of the first extensive 
depot contracts was with Lockheed Air Service for the Navy's 
fleet of C-121/EC-121 (super constellation) aircraft in the 
early 1950's. The Navy has subsequently contracted for 
depot maintenance of other transport and training aircraft 
such as the C-117, C-118, C-130, T-29, T-34 and the T-S2 
[1:25]. The Navy has also maintained a depot level Naval 
Air Rework Facility (NARF) to share the work load with 
the civilian contractors. 
In May of 1958, the Navy contracted with McDonnel 
Douglas aircraft for interim contract support for the F-4B 
during the test and evaluation phases of the aircraft acqui-
sition. The program lasted over five years and McDonnel 
Douglas provided material support for 10 locations amounting 
to 42 aircraft at one time. During this time a total of 
18,404 flight hours were flown [5:14]. 
In 1961, the Navy contracted for interim support in 
the P-3A program with Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. The 
contract extended from April 1961 until March 1963. During 
this time Lockheed supported as many as 29 different air-
craft at 6 different locations flying over 18,669 hours. 






at a total cost of 26 million dollars and at the comple-
tion of the program returned to the Navy a parts inventory 
valued at 24.6 million dollars [5:13]. 
In 1966, the Navy purchased the TC-4C; these were 
specially configured Gruman Gulfstream I aircraft to be 
used as electronic trainers for the A-6 weapons system. 
Due to the small amount purchased and the off-the-shelf 
air frames, the Navy decided to contract with Gruman for 
extended contractor logistics support for the engine and 
airframe. The Navy would support the peculiar avionics 
equipment. Gruman had agreed to supply all technical 
publications to Navy specifications. Two problems arose 
from this first logistics support program: 
1) There was no clear cut interface between the air-
frame and avionics equipment which made dividing 
the Navy/Gruman support responsibilities difficult 
[1:27]. 
2) Maintaining technical publications became very 
difficult because they were not under the naval 
technical publications system nor were they 
administered as FAA publications [1:27]. 
In 1967, the Navy contracted with Rockwell Internation-
al Corporation for logistics support of their newest 
acquisition, the CT-39E/G. This is a Navy off-the-shelf 
version of the Rockwell Sabreliner model 265-40/60. Using 
the lessons learned from the T-4C, the Navy contracted to 
provide government furnished equipment for only the UHF 
radio and TACAN (navigational system). The Navy maintained 
organizational maintenance while Rockwell performed inter-
mediate and depot level maintenance. The contract also 
stipulated that all Rockwell maintenance was to be done in 
accordance with FAA specifications. Having learned from 
the TC-4C contract, the Navy limited itself to supplying 
Rockwell with radio and navigational equipment manuals. 
In January 1968, the Navy contracted with Bell heli-
copter for 40 TH-57 helicopters to be used for the primary 
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phase of helicopter training. The contract provided for 
total contractor material support for the lifetime of the 
aircraft. The TH-57 is an off-the-shelf FAA certified 
Bell model 206-A jet ranger helicopter. The TH-57 contract 
was very similar to the T-39 (Sabreliner) contract but 
changes in the assessment of costs or repairable parts 
and penalty of late parts were added in. Here again the 
Navy provides organizational maintenance and Bell provides 
intermediate and depot level maintenance [1:30]. 
In 1973, the Navy received the first of 12 C-9B air-
craft. This is the Navy version of the off-the-shelf 
McDonnel Douglas DC-9. Again the contract for the C-9B 
included extended contractor logistics support. The Navy 
is responsible for the organizational level maintenance 
and McDonnel Douglas is responsible for the inter mediate 
and depot level maintenance, very similar to the Air Force's 
C-9A contract. A unique feature of the C-9B contract is 
that the contractor is responsible for furnishing parts 
"worldwide." Basically, up until this point, all of the 
off-the-shelf aircraft have used contractor logistics support, 
the difference being in the classification of parts, spares, 
time requirements and the penalties involved with government 
or contractor default. 
In late 1974, the Chief of Naval Operations requested 
that feasibility of total contractor support for the T-44A 
be investigated. The T-44A would be used to replace the 
old S-2 being used as the advanced flight trainer f or the 
Navy. This would include contractor performed servicing 
and maintenance as well as the element of augmented support. 
The task was assigned to the Institute for Management 
Science and Engineering of George Washington University. 
The resulting study detailed the operational requirement 






provided insights as to likely contract strategy. Advan-
tages and disadvantages of total contractor support were 
identified: 
ADVANTAGES 
1) Cost savings and great economy to the government. 
It has been proven in numerous studies that contractor 
logistics support promotes tremendous costs savings to 
the government. Civilian contractors are able to do the 
same job cheaper with less personnel [1:56]. Civilian 
c0ntractors obtain more work per labor hour than .military . 
personnel. Civilians are not burdened with such military 
requirements as training, watches and physical fitness. 
The Navy relies heavily on "on the job" training for it's 
personnel. A civilian contractor may hire an employee at 
a desired level of skill and experience. 
2) Start up costs-Stockpiling of spare parts can run 
into the millions of dollars. By buying off-the-shelf 
aircraft the contractor is responsible for stockpiling 
spares. The Air Force estimated a savings of seven million 
dollars by requiring the contractor to stockpile spares as 
part of the C-9A logistics support contract [2:28]. 
3) Reduction in Man Power requirements-Mandated reduc-
tions of military personnel coupled with low re-enlistment 
rates have significantly reduced the manning levels of the 
service. Utilization of contractor logistics support can 
be used to alleviate this problem particularly at the 
organizational level. In November of 1977, VT-3 accepted 
the first T-34C for the Navy. Prior to this time VT-3 was 
flying the T-28C/B with an organizational maintenance 
department of over 120 enlisted men. One year later, in 
November of 1978, VT-3 had a total of 23 administrative 
support personnel on board, none of these personnel were 
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involved with maintenance. Contractor maintenance had 
eliminated the requirement for enlisted maintenance per-
sonnel within the squadron. 
DISADVANTAGES 
1) Risk to mission accomplishment-Leaving the service 
vulnerable to industrial relations problems and strikes 
would have to be the number one disadvantage of contractor 
logistics. Although no strike clauses have been imposed, 
the damage from a walkout or wildcat during an emergency 
could cause irreputible damage, the harm would far exceed 
financial consideration. 
2) Opportunity for ship to shore rotation assignments-
By closing shore bases available to maintenance personnel 
you eliminate a slot in the ship to shore rotation cycle. 
The study concluded that the idea of total contractor 
support was feasible and probably cost effective. After 
review and verification of the study by the user, total 
contractor support was recommended to management and 
approved. 
In early 1975, the contract for the T-34C was signed. 
The Procurement Request (PR) for total contract maintenance 
was from the start, an integral part of the contract. The 
PR was initiated by the Assistant Project Manager for 
Logistics APML for PMA 271 [12]. 
The implementation of total contractor logistics support 
was through the efforts of PMA-271. This is the Naval Air 
Systems Command standing Project Team charged with the 
responsibility of support aircraft; to include special 
mission aircraft, transport aircraft, trainer aircraft, and 







The Navy now has three aircraft which depend on part-
nership with industry for life cycle support: The T-44A, 
T-34C and the UC-12B. (The UC-12B is not operational as 
of this date. It is due to be introduced to the fleet in 
August 1979). The contracts avoid overly detailed speci-
fications and government material. The approach relies on 
existing commercial systems and is consistent with U.S. 
commercial policy: 
•.. that the Federal Government will not start, or 
carry on any activity to provide a service or prod-
uct for its own use, if it can be procured from 
private enterprise through ordinary business channels 
[ 9] . 
The T-44 has been operational for more than two years 
and the T-34 for more than a year and a half. In addition 
to the anticipated problems, some unexpected problems have 
developed. The initiation of contract organizational 
maintenance is the first time the users (pilots) have not 
had a "buffer" (military level of maintenance) between 
themselves and the contractor. The problems discussed 
here will be those generated by the T-34C, the Navy's basic 
flight trainer. Although the problems have been developed 
in the training command they may be applicable to all total 
contract logistical supported programs. The use of total 
contract logistical support may apply to other than the 
training environment as in the case of the UC-12B, but 
total support is not applicable to combatant aircraft. 
The general policy stated in DOD directive 4151,1 is 
one of very limited use of contractural services for the 
accomplishment of organizational and intermediate mainte-
nance for combat related material. Specifically the 
directive states that "combat and combat support activities 
of the military departments will be self-sufficient in so 
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far as possible in providing direct maintenance support 
for assigned weapons systems and equipme nt ." [8,17]. 
An immediate problem which surfaced with the implemen-
tation of total contractor support was t hat of SAFETY. 
The maintenance personnel of BASI are not involved in the 
direct mi litary chain of command. BAS! personnel were hired 
to service aircraft, start aircraft and park aircraft. It 
is not uncommon to see a BAS! lineman wit hout ear or eye 
protection around a turning aircraft. Towing procedures 
and the requirements for wing walkers by BAS! maintenance 
personnel differed from that of the Navy's. 
On a military base which has separate squadrons being 
serviced by military maintenance and civilian maintenance 
problems begin to surface . Dual safety standards on the 
flight line develop. Dis sent among the enlisted ranks 
begins to emerge [4]. St andardizations of inspections 
were initially a big problem. BASI lineman were certifying 
aircraft safe for flight and pilots would go out to the 
aircraft only to find brake pucks missing or other obvious 
discrepancies. In the case of an enlisted man, he would 
face office hours f or obvious oversights on preflights 
inspections, for a BAS! employee there was no punitive 
action; the reason being, it was not written in the contract . 
Another case in po i nt; in a discussion with the 
TRAWING FIVE Aviation Safety Officer, it was brought out 
that fire bottles were not being manned while refueling 
aircraft as i s the procedure for refueling mi litary aircraft. 
BAS! was approached with this and i t was brought out that 
they were not responsible for manning fire bottles, just 
refueling the aircraft. The problem was sent up the chain 
of command to Commander of Naval Air Training (CNATRA). 
While the CNATRA Aviation safety officer was deciding how 







Liaison Officer (OSCLA), and told him that BASI personnel 
would man the fire bottles for an additional 1,100 dollars 
per man per month assigned to the flight line [4]. When 
the information was passed on to CNATRA safety, the decision 
was made that fire bottles during refueling for the T-34C 
were not required. 
During the implementation of the T-34C, the model mana-
ger (VT-3) changed Squadron Commanders, NATOPS Officers, 
Operations Officers, and Safety Officers . Personnel within 
the squadron assigned key positions with the T-34C program 
were rotated before full integration of the T-34C; this led 
to a lack of communication and information at times. 
The inflexibility of the contract has led to long lead 
times for contract changes. Rapid action engineering changes 
which were possible under government controlled maintenance 
were eliminated. If it is discovered that a minor change 
is required on the aircraft for a recurring problem, a 
corrective change cannot be implemented unless the contrac-
tor is paid a negotiated price [12]. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper was to give a brief look at 
the background in aviation contract logistics support and 
the integration over time from partial contractual logis-
tical support. The direct role Project Management played 
in its implementation was shown. It can be seen that the 
Army, Navy and Air Force have all in the past and continue 
to use at the present time, contract logistic support. All 
three have implemented 0MB Circular A-76 in varying degrees. 
Historically it can be seen that contract logistics support 
is being utilized more and more within the services. Pres -
ently the Navy uses aviation contract logistics support 
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in varying degrees from the provisioning function of the 
F-18, our newest and most advanced weapons sytem 1 to total 
contractor logistics support in the primary flight trainer 
The T-34C [10:44]. Due to the reductions in manpower levels 
and the costs savings of contract logistics support, this 
is the direction in which the Navy and the other services 
are heading. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is not within the scope of this paper to recommend 
to higher authority. The implementation of contractor 
logistics support is the way of the future but a closer 
look should be given by those who put their names on the 
contract to see the effects it has on those at the user 
level. Extreme care and study should be given to what goes 
into a contract, or what is omitted, and the implications 
of this at the user level. It is realized that problems 
may arise or be overlooked or even omitted. These problems 
can be renegotiated on later contracts, but if it costs 
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ASPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE F-16 
MULTINATIONAL FIGHTER PROGRAM 
by 
James E. Beakley 
ABSTRACT 
The author uses the new F-16 Multinational Fighter Program as a con-
structive example of the additional problems facing a program manager 
when the program becomes a multinational project as the theme of this 
paper. As more multinational cooperative programs are initiated, the 
lessons learned on the F-16 Program will require wider review and analysis 
throughout the military establishment. 
This paper was prepared for Professor Melvin B. Kline in partial fulfill-
ment of the course requirements of Project Management (AS.3501). 
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Before discussing the F-16 program, it is first necessary 
to explain some of the facets of Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS). FMS is the selling of U.S. produced military equipment 
and services to friendly governments or organizations under 
the authority of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968. 
The Pentagon's Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) 
administers FMS programs. The equipment sold may be supplied 
directly from the manufacturer or from current stocks owned 
by one of the military service departments. The contract in 
both cases, is with the supplier and the U.S. Government (USG) 
acts only in the formal role of purchasing agent. This, then, 
is not a contract between governments but an agreement to 
procure [Ref. 1]. 
Basically, the steps in a FMS are as follows: 
1) Upon receipt of a formal request, DSAA asks the appro-
priate military department to check priorities, ensure the 
arms are available, and that their sale will not interfere 
with U.S. needs. To become eligible for FMS purchases from 
the U.S. requires determination by the President that sales 
to that country will serve world peace and strengthen the 
security of the United States. 
2) Next, contract price and delivery data are established. 
This price includes the effects of training, support, main-
tenance administrative fees and for aircraft, a surcharge for 
a portion of the original research and development costs. 
3) A letter of offer is then submitted to the foreign 
buyers. This is the U. S. government's formal response to 
an approved arms request. This letter requires Congressional 
review (depending upon price). Section 36(b) of the Arms 
Export Control Act states: 
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"The letter of offer shall not be issu ed if the 
Congress, within thirty calendar days after 
receiving such certification adopts a concurrent 
resolution stating that it objects to the proposed 
sale, unless the President states in his certifica -
tion that an emergency exists which requires such 
sale in the national securit y interests of the 
United States." 
4) Once the letter of offer is received by the foreign 
government, it is free to sign a contract with the American 
prime contractor for the weapons system. Payment is handled 
by the Foreign government depositing funds in the specific 
military service logistics control office set up for this 
purchaser. Then under the terms of the contract~ the ser -
vice pays the U.S. contractor at specified intervals. 
Because FMS is conducted on a non-profit basis for the bene-
fit of the purchasing country, sales must be at no loss to 
the United States Government [Ref . 1) . 
Another aspect of FMS is co-production. Essentially, 
co-production id entifies any program wherein the USG, either 
directly or indirectly, enables a foreign country to acquire 
the "know-how" to manufacture, assemble, repair, or maintain 
a specific system. Certain countries then, used co-production 
to build up their own economy and production capabilities . 
As FMS became an accepted method of offsetting U.S. expendi-
tures overseas, so did co-production become a means for 
allied countries to offset their costs of purchasing U.S. 
weapons. 
In May 1977, Aviation Week estimated that the world 
market for advanced western-built fighter aircraft could 
reach 6,000 units over the next two decades as countries 
press to modernize their Air Forces. The major competitors 
are the Grumman F- 14, McDonnell Douglas/Northrop F-18, 
Dassault Mirage 2000, and General Dynamics F-16. (This does 
not include the F-5, Tornado, Jaguar). In light of the 
sheer numbers involved, the following comment contained in 






"USAF/General Dynamics F-16 Multinational Fighter Program 
has emerged as the test case that will determine if 
transatlantic aerospace collaboration can work, it 
NATO standardization is feasible and if the U.S. can 
deliver on commitments to as many as 15 air force cus-
tomers throughout the world. Stakes in the F-16 program 
are enormous, and so are the challenges. The challenges 
lie primarily in solving the complexitites of manage-
ment, not in the advanced technologies the aircraft 
incorporates." 
THE F-16 PROGRAM 
Beginnings 
The basis for the multinational F-16 program can be 
found in four areas: 
1) The lightweight fighter which eventually grew into 
the F-16 Air Combat Fighter had its genesis i n 1970 when 
David A. Packard, then Deputy Defense Secretary, directed 
the Air Force and Navy to nominate innovative programs 
for prototyping with the object of reversing the mushrooming 
costs of buying weapons [Ref. 2]. 
2) The Mideast war of 1973 forced U.S. planners to 
reassess the performance/capabilities versus numbers (of 
fighter aircraft) situation in the air superiority scenario, 
with the result that in 1974 the decision was made to initi-
ate the Air Combat Fighter Program based on the technology 
oriented Lightweight Fighter [Ref. 2]. 
3) This decision coincided with the decision by four 
NATO countries to replace their aging Lockheed F-104 Star 
Fighters (to become operational in the early 1980's). In 
1968 and 1969, Belgium and the Netherlands had withdrawn 
from participation in the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) 
program and formed a loose coalition with Denmark and Norway. 
In May 1974, these four countries sent a delegation to the 
U.S. to discuss the YF-16/YF-17 selection. 
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"One of the most noteworthy features of the NATO compe-
tition for a new lightweight fighter was that each of the 
three major bidders-Sweden's Viggen, France's F-1, and the 
United States' F-16--offered substantial inducements to 
the prospective buyers. These incentives ranged from 35 
percent of the value of each French F-1 produced to be 
manufactured by the four purchasing states to more than 50 
percent for each Swedish Viggen. Viggen also promised $1.2 
billion in nonaeronautical investments over the next 10 years 
in the form of Saab auto and Volvo truck plants to be built O 
in the European buyer countries. The United States F-16, 
winner of the competition, will entail 40 percent co-production 
on the 348 planes produced for the consortium, 10 percent 
co-production of the 650 ordered by the U.S. Air Force and 
15 percent co-production of all F-16s produced for export 
outside NATO. 
"The United States contract will be a dual-source scheme, 
meaning that each component produced in the four-nation NATO 
consortium is being produced in the United States in approxi-
mately equal numbers. The presumed advantages of this 
arrangement are that the competition between the manufacturers 
may result in lower prices and that the entire program will 
be less vulnerable to unforeseen events in either the United 
States or in the four European purchasing states. In con-
trast, the Viggen and F-1 programs were single-source plans, 
in which the components produced in the four countries would 
not be produced elsewhere. The advantages here are the 
usual benefits of longer production lines--lower per unit 
cost, with nonrecurring costs written off over a larger 
series and a greater "learning curve" effect" {Ref. 3]. 
The Europeans wanted a selection of one of the two 
prototypes in four months -- a selection which was not 
scheduled for at least a year. Herein was the first major 





Flyoff winner in a decreased time span (under former flight 
test concepts, it took two and a half years to thoroughly 
explore the performance envelope) without compromising 
either performance or the possible cost savings involved 
with a co-production by the European consortium. The rami-
fications of the selection were extreme. The selection of 
the winner in itself is a major undertaking. In addition, 
there were all the considerations of the European situation, 
and the possibility of adverse effects on the USAF/Navy 
acquisition process. 
4) Also of importance was the desire to increase NATO 
standardization. Although made during and after the F-16 
selection, these remarks are indicative of political think-
ing in this time frame. In 1975, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia 
began a push for NATO standardization and changes to the 
"Buy America" Act. In March 1976, he stated: "What was 
once little more than an intriguing topic of the cocktail 
party conversation has now become an issue upon whose reso-
lution hangs NATO's future viability as a collective security 
organization - a combination of dramatic increases of Soviet 
military capabilities and shrinking active force levels with-
in NATO has virtually prohibited a continuation of the vast 
duplication and waste associated with purely national 
approaches to weapons procurements, logistics, doctrine, 
and tactics." [Ref. 4]. 
In a speech to the Foreign Policy Association in June 
1976, President Carter stated "NATO's arsenal suffers from 
a lack of standardization which needlessly increases the 
cost of NATO ... We must not allow our deterrence to become 
an anchronism." 
The representatives of the European nations took part 
in the source selection as more than observers. They had 
input, although the final decision was U.S. alone. The 
Air Force had to accept that what was good for them was not 
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necessarily good for the Europeans. Both aircraft were 
found acceptable by the five countries and in January 1975 
the USAF announced the selection of the F-16 (at this time 
the Navy was unable to make a choice and eventually selected 
the F-18 based on the YF-17 prototype). The contract with 
General Dynamics was structured to have either a U.S. only 
program or a multinational program. The F-16 Multinational 
Fighter Program actually came into being when the European 
Participating Governments (EPG) selected the F-16 over the 
Viggen and Mirage F-1 and signed a Memorandum of Understand-
ing on 7 June 1975. The USG signed on 10 June and thus 
exercised the Multinational options of the F-16 contract 
[Ref. 5] • 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) 
Some of the more important aspects of the MOU are 
discussed below: 
1) Management - The USG is responsible for managing 
the program. To facilitate this, a Multinational Fighter 
Program Steering Committee has been established with one 
member f rom each country. 
2) Taxes and Duty-Free Entry - The consortium members 
intend through the MOU to eliminate all such costs from the 
F-16 program. 
3) Configuration Management - The intent is for all 
countries to avoid configuration changes to the aircraft 
unless they are clearly indispensible and cost effective. 
All components that are common to all five members form the 
baseline configuration. Changes unique to one or more 
countries but not common to all five, do not alter the base-
line configurat i on. 
4) Offset - The offset commitment is based on 
curement value of the baseline configuration only. 
the pro-
The 






flyaway cost plus initial spares, ground equipment, data 
training equipment, and the pro rata charge for non-recurring 
costs. 
5) Offset requirements - The 10, 40 and 15 percent 
offsets, defined in the MOU are requirements. In addition, 
the USG has committed itself to a minimum offset level of 
58 percent of the initial EPG procurement and assuming third 
country purchases of 500 more F-16's sets a target offset of 
80 percent. 
6) Offset distribution - The USG and EPG agree to the 
principle that work distribution shall be proportional to 
the procurement value of each country's initial buy. 
7) Directed subcontracts - During MOU negotiations the 
subject of "directed subcontracts" was discussed. As a 
result of those discussions the following clause was inserted 
into the MOU: 
The parts and components which the industries in the 
EP countries are specifically directed by the USG 
or the US Prime Contractors or their suppliers 
to buy from, and which are produced by the US Prime 
Contractors or their suppliers outside the EP coun-
tries and to be incorporated in European co-production 
items, shall not be counted as compensation. 
This clause is important in that it attempts to define 
those portions of EP related contracts/subcontracts which 
do not count against the offset commitment . 
The clause implicitly establishes the need to segregate 
EP industry contracts into two sections--one which counts 
for the offset and one which does not. Prior to the inser-
tion of this clause, the face value of any EP industry 
contract/subcontract would have counted against the offset 
requirement. This would have eased the traceability of 
such offsets. 
8) Estimated program costs - The price for the F-16 
is a contractually established not-to-exceed price ($6.091 
million) based on January 1975 dollars. 
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9) Currency Exchange Rates - The Steering Committee is 
responsible for drawing up procedures to prevent loss or 
gain to contractors as a result of fluctuating exchange rates. 
10) Actual program costs - The EPG will pay actual 
production costs for EPG aircraft (airframe, engine, radar, 
and Government Furnished Aeronautical Equipment) up to the 
not-to-exceed price in the MOU. To the extent that the 
actual production program varies from MOU requirements, 
corresponding positive or negative price adjustments will 
be made to the not-to-exceed price thereby affecting the 
offset commitment. All non-recurring costs for production 
in Europe will be borne by the EPG. 
Neither the EPG nor the USG will seek recovery for the 
use of existing EPG or USG tooling, facilities, or other 
government non-consumable production property when used 
for production of aircraft for the USG or EPG. A recoupment 
plan will be established by the USG in accordance with DOD 
(Department of Defense) policies and in consultation with 
the Steering Committee for the use of USG and EPG properties 
for third country scales [Ref. 5]. 
In more general terms, the MOU is the basic charter for 
the multinational F-16 program. The MOU sets forth the 
general policies and principles agreed to by the five coun-
tries (Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, and the 
U.S.) for the operation and management of the cooperative 
program. 
Other major aspects of the MOU include: 
The United States Government (USG), subject to Con-
gressional authorization and appropriations, plan to procure 
650 F-16 aircraft. 
The European Participating Governments (EPG) plan to 
procure 348 F-16 aircraft. 
As a result of the MOU, European participating govern-
ment personnel are assigned to and fully integrated into 






AFB, Ohio, the F-16 European System Program Office (ESPO) 
in Brussels and the test program being conducted at Edwards 
AFB, California. 
The European industrial participation plan is based on 
the four European countries producing 10 percent of the 
components and support material for USAF F-16 aircraft, 40 
percent of the EPG aircraft, and 15 percent of third country 
purchases of the F-16 aircraft. In this regard, the con-
tinuation of industrial participation through third country 
sales is indicative of the partnership relationship among 
the five countries for the multinational F-16 program. 
Final airframe assembly lines for the EPG aircraft will 
be established in Belgium and The Netherlands. Belgium 
will also provide final assembly of the F-100 engine for EPG 
aircraft. 
Advanced technology cooperation and transfer are impor-
tant features of this program. All elements of the F-16 
aircraft, with a few exceptions, will be released to the EPG 
for advanced technology transfer. 
The unit price of the planned buy of 348 aircraft to 
the EPG as described in the MOU is $6.09M an aircraft in 
January 1975 dollars although the final cost to the EPG is 
expected to be lower [Ref. 7]. 
The planned buy of F-16 aircraft by the parties to the 
MOU are: 
United States: 650 (approximately 15 percent are two 
place 
Belgium: 116 (of which 12 are two place) 
Denmark: 58 (of which 12 are two place) 
The Netherlands:102 (of which 22 are two place) 
It should be noted that although the MOU establishes 
provisions for co-production, it still follows FMS procedures 
(i.e., government to government basis). Under this plan all 
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F-16's will be built by General Dynamics for the USG which 
will transfer the aircraft to the purchasing country. 
F-16 PROGRAM TO DATE 
Much has been written concerning the F-16 program and 
its problems. It was not the intent to rewrite these already 
well written analyses. The reader is referred to references 
5 and 6 in their entirety for an extensive analysis of the 
F-16 program through June 1979. 
The key problem areas of the multinational program are 
listed and discussed below: 
1) Status of the EPG co-production. Not all of the 
subcontracts to the EPG have been let. Norway and Denmark 
do not feel they have received an equitable share of the 
offset. 
2) The parent company of Fairey SA (would assemble 174 
aircraft) in Belgium, declared bankruptcy in October 1977. 
A new company called Sonaca was formed and has sustained 
operations but has fallen behind schedule. 
3) Third country sales - the procurement value for 
sales to Israel has not been quantified for offset calcula-
tion purposes. There are some political questions by two 
of the countries concerning third country sales. 
4) Loadings is a term used to describe overhead and 
other charges added to the price of the F-16. The EPGs 
have expressed concern that the manner in which these load-
ings are allocated in the U.S. unduly increases the cost of 
European produced parts and, in turn, EPG F-16's. This 
brings in the question of being "reasonably competitive," 
without which their production would be dropped. 
5) Conversion of Currencies. Despite what the MOU 
states, at least two European co-producers have experienced 






stand to lose 83 million dollars in converting to EPG 
currency due to the dollar's decline. 
6) U.S. Procurement laws and regulations are much more 
strict than European practices. This has led to increased 
staffing, dual accounting systems, and thus increased cost. 
7) Cost impact of co-production on USAF aircraft -
This actually increases the cost of the aircraft due in 
large to multiple production lines. Other items are listed 
under "lessons learned." 
8) Reliability Improvement Warranty - Due to having the 
EPGs accept this warranty on certain avionics components, 
the cost to the U.S. has substantially increased. 
9) NATO Standardization - This is being met very well. 
Still to be determined is the use of JP-8 jet fuel. Inter-
operability (exchange services) is tracking well, but 
interchangeability in relation to ordnance includes only the 
British BL-755 cluster bomb and the French MATRA-250 general 
purpose bomb. 
10) Industrial outlook, management depth, and production 
ideas and capabilities are much different from U.S. practices. 
The European position is more simple and straightforward. 
They feel "over-managed" by the large U.S. on-site teams, 
accounting practices and reports required [Ref. 2]. 
It can be readily seen that these problems are somewhat 
different from those that would exist in a U.S. alone pro-
gram. In its special report on the F-16 Aviation Week stated: 
Conventional management tasks in military aircraft 
acquisition are control of cost, schedule and 
quality along with crew training, weapon certification 
and after-delivery support. The F-16 incorporates 
all these tasks along with a multitude of differences 
in approach among the five co-producing countries. 
Chief among them: 
o Philosophies of doing business. 
o Methods of auditing and cost accounting. 
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o Procedures for tracking progress. 
o Industrial output efficiency. 
o Factors used to measure escalation and inflation. 
0 Stability of currency. 
Add to these philosophical and social differences a 
myriad of interlocking agreements among subcontrac-
tors and governments plus a mind-boggling volume of 
material and components that will flow both ways 
between the U.S. and Europe, and the challenge comes 
into focus. 
Size of the program makes it a natural for the 
political spotlight, particularly in Europe where it 
has become an issue at each election. 
The F-16 program manager would seem to find himself 
in the position not only of solving the expected problems 
inherent in any major weapons sytem but also of solving 
them in the light of a myriad of world-wide ramifications. 
Not only does a decision to change the configuration effect 
the normal expected cost of the aircraft but has implications 
on the baseline aircraft, standardization and interopera-
bility, offset values and offset commitment. "Right" 
decisions for the USAF may be ultimately wrong for the EPG. 
Major General James A. Abrahamson, F-]6 Program Director has 
stated "This is by far the most complex program in the 
Defense Department, probably the most complex in history." 
The Air Force has run the project using a combination of 
project management structure and matrix structure. Essen-
tially the matrix organization persists in the strictly 
engineering and contracting levels, while the upper echelon 
follows the conventional project management flow of authority 
and responsibility. The program has had setbacks - most 
very visible, but it has also had its successes. GAO in 
its conclusion to Congress [Ref. 6] stated: 
The European governments and co-producers, the 
U.S. Government, GD, P&WA, and other U.S. con-






implementing the F-16 multinational program. 
The co-production requirement has created 
numerous challenges previously not present 
in acquiring U.S. aircraft. Identifying parts 
and components suitable for co-production; 
selecting capable European contractors with 
reasonably competitive prices; negotiating 
contract terms; complying with U.S. procure-
ment regulations, CAS, and co-production 
offset requirements; and meeting other pro-
gram commitments have complicated this effort. 
However, all participants working cooperative-
ly have met the challenges thus far. 
LESSONS LEARNED AND IMPLICATIONS TO THE FUTURE 
The F-16 Program Office has published an extensive work 
on "Lessons Learned" in the F-16 Multinational Fighter 
Program and is in the Systems Acquisition Management Library. 
The long-range implication of this program and the lessons 
learned can be found in considering the title of the Aviation 
Week article quoted earlier - "Need for West's Fighters PUT 
at 6000.'' This number includes only those aircraft specifi-
cally needed for Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM) capability. 
For countries with small defense budgets, these aircraft 
most nearly stretch across the design spectrum of close air 
support, interdiction, ACM and intercept. To include needs 
of Air Forces whose mix of aircraft includes those designed 
more on point design for ground attack (A-10, A-7) would 
increase the numbers substantially above 6000. The world 
aircraft market is at the state where its 1950, 1960 vintage 
aircraft are no longer viable in combating the threats of 
today. The market is there, the game is complex, the stakes 
are high and the competition will be extreme. The F-16 
Multinational Fighter Program seems destined to be the 
"Textbook" for future program managers. The chances of having 
a multinational program seem to be the destiny of aircraft 
procurement and management. 
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The past ten to fifteen years have been a difficult period 
for the American military-a period of change and adjustment. 
We have seen the Vietnam conflict and the protests associated 
with it; the implementation of the all-volunteer services; 
the racial incidents such as those on board the USS Kitty 
Hawk and at Camp LeJuene; and the increasing emphasis on 
austerity and on the need to do more with less. At the same 
time, we have seen society as a whole become increasingly 
interested in individual freedom and individual rights, and 
more prone to question and even defy authority. These trends 
have, of necessity, affected the mil itary and have forced 
some response and some change. 
Perhaps one of the most significant effects of these 
recent events has been some acknowledgement by the military 
services of the importance of properly managing the human 
resource. The race relations seminars of a few years ago 
have given way to a more comprehensive approach to HRM 
(Human Resource Management), an approach that now includes 
not only equal opportunity issues but also leadership develop-
ment, organizational effectiveness, OD (Organization Develop-
ment) and the like. However, the concept of human resource 
management as a formalized discipline is in its infancy in 
the military and the future of HRM in general (and OD in 
particular) is still subject to much conjecture. What are 
some of the issues that should be addressed when looking at 
the concept of OD in the military? What considerations may 
determine the future of OD in the defense establishment? 
One of the first questions that comes to mind involves 
the degree of top level support that OD will receive over 
the next few years. While commitment from the top does not 
necessarily guarantee success, the lack of high level inter-
est can doom a concept to failure, especially if the concept 






can be all of these, it would seem that the future of OD in 
the military may depend, at least to some extent, on the 
degree of support it receives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and service secretary levels. Unfortunately, there is no 
evidence that would indicate that this commitment exists at 
the present time. 
There seems to be some concern over symptoms (low reten-
tion rates for example) but as yet little interest in real 
problems and real solutions. Too often ranking leaders do 
not exhibit a sensitivity to the human element of the mili-
tary. And yet evidence of concern about the human resource 
would seem to be essential before it can be said that OD 
has been accepted by the top echelons of the Department of 
Defense. It appears that honest high level support for OD 
as a viable tool for improvement of the military currently 
does not exist. Hopefully this situation will change as the 
services gain experience with and show results from their 
current (and somewhat limited) use of OD methodology. How-
ever, at the present time the apparent lack of real commit-
ment from the top seems to be an obstacle that OD proponents 
will have to overcome. 
Another barrier to wide scale acceptance of OD by the 
services stems from the concept of officer fitness reports, 
and their emphasis on short-term performance--often at the 
expense of long range goals. Since the normal tour of duty 
for a military officer is relatively brief (on the order of 
two years), and since rotation dates are predictable, the 
natural tendency in the officer corps is to concentrate on 
optimizing today's efforts even though such actions may turn 
out to be counter-productive in the long run. This seems 
understandable since the officer is being evaluated on the 
basis of how well he or she is performing his present job 
(as measured by short-term results); the long-range effects 
of his actions (good or bad) are not normally reflected on 
his fitness report. Consequently, this entire philosophy can 
be a major obstacle to serious OD efforts since many OD 
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interventions require a fairly lengthy period of time to 
show significant results. Compounding the problem is the 
fact that interim results for OD may be less impressive than 
those that could be achieved with a "give orders and kick 
ass" philosophy since OD is based on permanent but not neces-
sarily immediate improvement. Therefore, if an officer does 
elect to implement on OD strategy, he may end up penalizing 
himself and rewarding his replacement since positive results 
from his actions may not become apparent until after he has 
left. Not many individuals are altruistic enough to con-
sciously make this kind of decision and, therefore, the 
short-range outlook of the military, vis-a-vis fitness reports, 
can serve to discourage the use of organization development 
techniques. 
Another obstacle to the successful use of OD in the mili ~ 
tary is also related to the concept of the two year tour of 
duty. Many spokesmen for OD address the importance of either 
top level management of the OD effort or at least clear - cut 
commitment to the concept of OD from the top of the system. 
The degree of commitment or involvement is, of course, depen-
dent on the individual involved; a change in leaders midway 
through an OD program could result in a slow death for the 
effort should the new leader not support the program. Unfor-
tunately a two year tour of duty often does not allow any 
one officer enough time to become familiar with the organi-
zation, assess the climate, identify the problems, seek expert 
help, and implement and follow through with an OD program. 
The military leader may very well find himself moving on 
before the OD program is completed. 
The acceptance of OD by the military is also hampered by 
the fact that many individuals do not really understand what 
OD is. It is often viewed not as an effort than can benefit 
both the organization and its members, but rather as something 






to say, this image can be the kiss-of-death for OD, especially 
when one is dealing with task focused individuals--people 
who are so interested in getting the job done that they may 
be insensitive to interpersonal relationships and the needs 
of their subordinates. Since emphasis on the task rather than 
on people seems to accurately characterize the average mili-
tary leaderfA) it follows that the degree of acceptance of 
OD by the military may well be related to how well the concept 
is understood. As long as it is seen as being strictly people 
related rather than as a tool to improve the organization, 
it will probably not achieve the degree of support that it 
should. However it would seem that this barrier should be 
fairly easy to remove (or at least minimize) via the educa-
tional process since it involves increasing the understanding 
of what OD is rather than an attempt to change individual 
values, leadership style, etc. 
One final obstacle that OD seems to face involves what 
appears to be inadequate staffing of the human resources 
management function within the services. In the Navy at 
least, the number of qualified HRM personnel seems far below 
the staffing level required to adequately support the function. 
In all fairness, it should be noted that some effort is being 
made to train additional personnel in the HRM area. However 
(A)Research conducted by Dr. John Senger, Professor of 
Management and Behavioral Sciences at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, seems to support this statement. Dr. 
Senger administered the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule, 
a commonly used tool for measuring personality features, to 
a number of groups of military officers attending the Post-
graduate School. These tests indicated that the average 
officer scored highest in task related areas (the eighty-ninth 
percentile for dominance and the eighty-first percentile for 
achievement) and lowest in the people related areas (nurtur-
ance, abasement and affiliation where the percentiles were 
twenty, twenty-one and thirty-nine respectively). 
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the number of individuals receiving training does not yet 
seem to match the need. And interestingly enough, even when 
trained Naval officers leave the HRM graduate curriculum, 
their first tour of duty involves not an HRM assignment but 
rather an assignment with their normal co mmunity (i.e., 
surface, air or submarines). Thus the shortage of trained 
HRM personnel is compounded by the way in which those who 
are trained are used. 
The prognosis for OD in the military is not totally 
negative. On the contrary, there are some very favorable 
signs--signs which seem to indicate that OD may in fact 
have a future in the services. Perhaps one of the most 
encouraging factors concerns the changing nature of the 
officer corps. Today's younger officers (i.e., those 35 
years of age and under) seem more concerned with the quality 
of life and with social issues than were their predecessors. 
This undoubtedly is a reflection of the changes occurring 
in society as a whole--changes that include a decreasing 
acceptance of autocratic or authoritarian leadership and a 
growing emphasis on individuality, openness, humanism, con-
cern and change. If the average young officer today is in 
fact less prone to adopt an authoritarian style of leadership, 
and if he is also more concerned with people issues than 
previous generations may have been, then it would seem to 
follow that OD in the military has the potential to grow in 
stature as today's young officers move into more and more 
senior positions. 
Another factor that would seem to enhance the future of 
OD in the defense establishment involves the ever expanding 
body of knowledge in the behavioral science area. The cred-
ibility of the behavioral sciences has increased dramatically 
over the past two or three decades as more and more has been 






of the behavioral sciences has increased, the application of 
behavioral science knowledge for the purpose of integrating 
organizational objectives and individual needs has become 
more and more prevalent. This increasing use of the applied 
behavioral sciences such as OD seems to indicate that organ-
ization development is growing in acceptance as a tool for 
improvement and for change. The growth thus far has perhaps 
been more rapid in industry than in the military, but the 
mere existence of OD courses (and for that matter an entire 
HRM curriculum) at graduate level military schools seems to 
indicate that the services are at least starting to accept 
OD as a legitimate discipline. It would seem reasonable to 
predict that this acceptance will continue to increase as 
DOD gains more experience with the concept. 
The outlook for OD in the military is not merely a func-
tion of either the changing values of today's younger military 
leaders or the growing acceptance of the field of applied 
behavioral science. According to Beckhard, OD is an effort 
(1) planned, (2) organization-wide, and (3) managed from the 
top to (4) increase organization effectiveness and health 
through (S) planned intervention in the organization's 
"processes" using behavioral science knowledge [lJ. This 
definition, by stressing both the planned aspect of OD and 
its purpose (to increase organization effectiveness and 
health), implies that an organization development effort is 
a response to a perceived need for improvement . Bennis says 
almost the same thing when he states that one important char-
acteristic of OD is the fact that it is concerned with the 
organization's felt need in areas such as leadership, conflict 
and communication [2J. In other words, an organization's 
leaders must recognize the fact that a problem exists and 
must have a desire to take corrective action before OD can 
be effectively utilized. Furthermore, it would seem logical 
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to assume that the willingness of an organization to attempt 
any change strategy would be somewhat proportional to top 
management's view of the severity of the problem since 
management would logically be more prone to pursue change 
when problems are perceived as being serious. Therefore, 
the outlook for OD in any organization would seem to be 
dependent on management's percept i on of its problems; those 
viewed as being most serious would seem to offer the greatest 
opportunities for the use of OD. 
If this is in fact the case , then many opportunities for 
the use of OD exist within the military. The problems with 
retention of personnel, the recognition of the need to find 
a way to make the services more attractive to the trained 
technical specialists who are leaving in ever increasing 
numbers, and the growing gap between individual expectations 
and the reality of service life all seem to point to the 
need for change--change tha t is based on reducing the conflict 
between organizational requirement s and individual needs . 
There is little question that the problems facing the services 
today are serious. The question rather seems to be whether 
or not military leadership is willing to accept the need for 
significant change in lieu of approaches that attack symptoms 
rather than problems. The cosmetic approaches to problem 
solving that seem to be in vogue today will continue to show 
little in terms of results and thus the felt need for change, 
to use Bennis's words, will increase. As this need grows, 
the prospects for OD in the military should also grow since 
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During this past quarter several guest speakers emphasized 
the processes occurring between Union and Management during 
contract negotiations, grievance procedures, and arbitration. 
This paper examines the skills and tactics that have been 
used by Government contract ~egotiators in major systems 
acquisitions. The systems acquisition process, rather than 
a management/labor process, is reviewed due to availability 
of information and the assumption that a negotiation process 
will display the same skills and tactics in varying degrees 
as the particular environment changes. 
The authors, Rubin and Brown, emphasize the negotiation 
process in the following statement: 
"In no other procedure does so much money change hands 
based on the ability of a single individual as it does 
in negotiations. In Government contracting particular-
ly, a negotiator can make or break the company. He is 
the most important profit center the company has. He 
should be chosen, trained, and treated accordingly." 
[8:16] 
NEGOTIATING FACTORS 
Successful negotiators share two common attributes: 
1) all habitually enter negotiations with higher negotiating 
goals (e.g., costs, schedule and performance) than their 
adversaries and, 2) all already are included, or are destined 
to quickly become included, among a firm's most highly valued 
and highly paid professionals [6:164]. 
Many factors in the negotiating setting are beyond the 
control of the negotiator (e.g., budget, contracting source 
and conflicting programs). He must accept these variables 
prior to entering negotiations and use them in his strategy. 
A number of these factors affect the relative bargaining 
positions in a particular negotiation session and consequently 
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the Government negotiator's position is severely weakened. 
On the other hand, the negotiator's position can be strength-
ened by: 
1. The availability of an alternate contractor. 
2. A competing program that produces a similar system 
for the same military service. 
3. The availability of credible cost analysis before 
the program. 
4. Strong support for the negotiator from above. 
5. A threat of cancellation of the program by higher 
level Government personnel. 
The contractor's negotiating position is stL"engthened by: 
1. Designation of the program as "urgent". 
2. The inability of another contractor to perform work 
on the program. 
3. The limited amount of time available to the Government 
to arrive at a contract agreement. 
4. The availability of extensive supporting data for 
costs and schedule projections. 
5, Contacts at higher levels in the Government with 
officials who will remind the Government negotiator 
that the negotiations should be "fair" and not prej-
udicial to the contractor [4:352]. 
These aforementioned factors are part of the environment 
in which the negotiator is involved before he even begins to 
put his trade to work. There is one other factor to consider 
in the environment. Chester Karrass stated that "in success-
ful negotiations both parties gain, but more often than not 
one party wins more than the other." [1:3] 
Strategies of the negotiating process can assume several 
paths and one such strategy which has become a classic is 






buyer has a maximum position and the seller a minimum. Dur-
ing negotiations the buyer makes concessions from his starting 
position toward his realistic objective; and the seller 
does the same. As both parties approach their respective 
realistic objectives, negotiations become more intense and 
critical. The area of objective persuasion, or agreement is 
where the better negotiator _demonstrates his superior ability 
by ending up closer to his realistic objective than the other 
negotiator to his objective [l:4J. It would seem that the 
hands of the Government negotiator are tied to the objective 
of "fair and reasonable" price. The objective is not always 
to get the most for the least amount of money. The Govern-
ment negotiator has many other objectives in mind such as 
optimum schedule, financing and, administrative controls 
which make it that much more important for the negotiator 
to do his homework thoroughly to expose flaws in the strategy 
of the contractor where possible. 
Prior to entering negotiations, many influences have 
knowingly and unknowlingly been made affecting the contracts 
outcome. Unfortunately these influences significantly reduce 
the negotiators flexibility. The negotiator must clearly 
have the authority to make the final decisions. Caution must 
be exercised by all staff members not to identify specific 
requirements, funds, or procurement methods anticipated for 
the process. Also individuals involved should be careful 
not to place the potential contractor in a favored position 
or the Government negotiator will be at an even weaker posi-
tion once at the negotiation table. It is important that one's 
minimum and maximum objectives (returning to McDonald's Model) 
in a negotiation not be disclosed to the contractor prior 
to the beginning of the bargaining session. 
The location of the negotiations is critical and depends 
on several factors such as the product, contractor, negotia-
tor's authority and previous background information. Although 
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there is a clear psychological advantage derived from the 
home court advantage, negotiating at the contractor's plant 
may also be advantageous. It can permit ease and accessi-
bility to the contractor's field personnel and makes it 
difficult for the contractor to hide facts [7:82]. 
Once at the negotiating table the negotiation team must 
not lose sight of their st~ategy to acquire the greatest 
cost-effectiveness. The skillful negotiator should define 
the issues and prepare an agenda to ensure the issues are 
covered. At this point in the process various tactics become 
prevalent . The key to successful negotiations is to maintain 
the meeting and not walk out (although this is a tactic). 
Fox presents an interesting example of on e tactic. "The 
Russians seem to enjoy 'brinksmanship'. It is not uncommon 
for an American in Moscow to be told the deal is off when 
he will not accept a Russian proposal. When arriving at the 
airport for the trip home, he receives a pleading message 
requesting that negotiations be resumed." [4:159] In this 
instance a hostility reliever would have been in order. 
Hostility relievers can take many forms in contract negotia-
tions. Such measures range from a small thing such as a 
recess to a rather complex maneuver of arbitration. The pri-
mary purpose of a hostility reliever is to provide relief 
from an unpleasant situation and facilitate the restoration 
of a working atmosphere in the negotiations [7:80]. Although 
every effort is usually made on contract negotiations to 
avoid a deadlock situation, there are circumstances when a 
deadlock may prove to be an important negotiating tactic 
[7:86]. On the other hand, irrationality can be an effective 
tactic. All the negotiator need do is convince his opponent 
that he is "emotionally committed to the reasonableness of 
an irrational position." [5:72] 
The buyer should strive never to lose the initiative 






proposal. He should work hard to retain it [6:160]. The 
negotiator is constantly evaluating the situation and making 
tradeoffs involving decisions to give up one strategic goal 
to obtain another [7:72]. This situation occurs when the 
negotiator is confronted by a requirement to make a decision 
between appealing alternatives. The negotiator also employs 
concessions by giving up points on one issue in order to 
solicit concessions from the contractor on other issues which 
the negotiator may feel are more critical to his negotiation 
objectives [7:89]. 
Altering the period of time consumed by compression or 
extension because of ongoing background decisions in antici-
pation of the contract can also influence the sense of urgency 
placed on the negotiations as perceived by the negotiating 
parties [7:85]. The skill of the respondent in answering 
questions may be a tactic for the individual asking the ques-
tion from the standpoint that a less skillful respondent 
may be caught up in his response to a loaded question [7:88]. 
Keeping the negotiations moving is a common tactic used to 
avoid getting the negotiations hung up on any one issue. The 
perceptive negotiator will direct the flow of the negotiations 
by following his agenda and moving from one issue to the next 
in order to appear that he is maintaining a positive atmosphere 
of agreement, carefully avoiding any issue of non-agreement 
[7:91]. 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Among all of the facts identified that promote negotiating 
effectiveness, Rubin and Brown focused their attention on 
the personal characteristics of the negotiator as the leading 
factor influencing the outcome of the negotiations. Based 
on their review of research literature available, they found 
that: More effective negotiations ensued when power among 
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the negotiators was equal rather than unequal. The party with 
the greatest power tended to behave exploitatively, while 
the party with the lesser power tended to behave submissively. 
However, the smaller the total amount of power, the more 
effective the negotiations were likely to function. 
In a master's thesis conducted by two Air Force officers, 
Novak and Whitley (1976) and again by two others, Bearden 
and Chipman (1977), focus was placed on the problem of iden-
tifying and rank-ordering the most important characteristics 
of Air Force contract negotiators. A sample of forty-two 
skilled negotiators responded to the questionnaire and iden-
tified their impressions of desirable traits and relative 



















































[9 : 13] 
Of the twenty-three traits ranked the top seven of the 
most elaborated upon from the comment section of the ques-
tionnaire were planning ability, patience, self-confidence, 
rational judgement, authority, experience, and education. 
The comments indicated that planning ability was significant 
and essential but the Government negotiator never has the 
time to carefully preplan his courses of action before the 
actual negotiations. Conversely it was also commented that 






begin the situation may change. Patience was cited as the 
most common and necessary element in negotiations but that 
it ceases to be a virtue when it wastes time and money. It 
is important but even more important is to be able to sense 
when a show of impatience is required to get the job done. 
Self-confidence was ranked number one as a desirable trait 
but the comment was made that it was not absolutely essential 
or vital for a skilled negotiator to possess. At least one 
respondee did think that it was of prime importance indicat-
ing that one can't do a job well if he feels it is beyond 
his capabilities. Judgement was an important part in the well-
rounded negotiator. The use of a reasonable logical approach 
is vital because for your opponent to disagree with such an 
approach makes him appear unreasonable. The negotiator needs 
to have the authority commensurate with his job if his nego-
tiating position is to be strong. It upgrades the image of 
the negotiator in the eyes of the other negotiating team. 
The amount of practical knowledge gained through personal 
participation in actual negotiation was important but as 
commented, everyone has to start without experience. Execu-
tives were least concerned with their negotiator's formal 
education. Although a college degree is desirable, a logical, 
common sense approach to plan and effectively utilize avail-
able expertise far outweights the requirements for formal 
education [9:54-61] . 
Various authors have expressed their opinions on what 
attributes a good negotiator possesses. Dr. Chester L. 
Karrass, who performed his doctoral research in the area of 
negotiations, and who subsequently wrote the book, The Nego-
tiating Game, proposed that the attributes of a good negotiator 
include the following: 
Planning skill 
Ability to think clearly under stress 





Ability to perceive and explicit power 
There are basic skills identified in this paper that 
the negotiator should possess if he ever hopes to be on an 
even par with his opponent. As to which skills are the 
most important--they are whatever combination of the various 
skills which make that particular negotiator effective. 
The best negotiator in any situation changes as the opponent 
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This paper explores the approaches which may be taken 
in planning and contro l ling time in a project. A historical 
approach is used which in no way implies that a former tec h -
nique has in all cases necessarily given way to a more rece nt 
development. To the contrary, all the techniques have 
applicab i lity depending upon the magnitude and complexity of 
the project. 
THE SCHEDULE TECHNIQUE 
A schedule by usual definition is a l i sting of jobs to 
be done, usually according to the planned or expected seq uence 
of operation . A schedule calls out due dates and time limi-
tations involved i n t he project. It often calls out manpower 
or equipment requ i rements and may even list the major material 
inputs. 
Written schedu l es were probably used along with pictures 
and diagrams for the construction of the great pyramids of 
Egypt and have had continuing va l ue through the years for 
planning and control . Schedules are particularly effective 
in the planning and control of re petitive work . The simple 
schedule illustrated in Figure 1 lists jobs to be done rough-
ly according to their planned sequence, the time duration of 
the various jobs, and the time at which these jobs are expect-







RE:QUIHED JOB!] llU1 •:A'1'lON OF l\C'l'lVI'l'Y 
Excavate 01 Jan - 01 Mar 00 .. 
Procure Major Equip111cmt 01 Jan - 01 Apr 80 
Pour F'ountlld;iom.: Ul i•L:lr - 01 l,Jay 80 
Pour r;:110 \·Jails 01 Apr - 01 Jun 80 
Install Equi1:ment 01 Jun - 01 Sep 80 
Install Lii'e Support 01 Aug - 01 Oct 80 
Install Wiring 01 Sep - 01 Nov 80 
System Checkout 01 Nov - 01 Dec 80 
Figure 1. The Schedule 
In complex project work a written schedule has several 
disadvantages. It includes no means of directly depicting 
the interrelationship of the various jobs, limited means of 
evaluating progress, and little or no means of demonstrating 
the effect of project slippages. 
THE GANTT OR BAR CHART TECHNIQUE 
The Gantt or familiar bar chart was an early 20th Century 
development to aid in controlling time in a project . The 
simple bar chart illustrated in Figure 2 lists jobs to be 
done roughly according to their planned sequence, graphically 
shows the time duration of the various jobs, and the time at 
which these jobs are expected to start and finish. Many bar 
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charts include a provision for "filling in" progress to date 
as a measure of actual performance against planned performance 
FOLINDA'l'IOU PHEPAHA'l'IOH ( \'Jl:.EKS) 
fUiQllIRl-~D .JOBS 
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Iru:;tall •.-~ring 
System Checkout -
Figure 2. Typical Gantt or Bar Chart 
The bar chart is an improvement over the written schedule 
for planning and control of complex projects, but it also 
has several limitations. The bar chart does not clearly show 
job dependencies and often has questionable value in depict-
ing the effects of program slippages. 
THE MILESTONE CHART TECHNIQUE 
The milestone chart technique, as originally developed 
and used by the United States Air Force, is a variation of 
the bar chart. Arrowheads and other symbols are added to 
each end of the bars. These symbols indicate the major 
achievement points or "milestones of progress" in the project. 
These symbols can easily be coded to show actual occurrence, 






similar project data [1,6]. Typical milestone charts and 
symbols are shown in Figures 3 and 4. 
The milestone chart improves graphic visibility for 
project control over the bar chart and in this way further 
aids project management. Like the bar chart, job dependen-
cies are still implicit and the ability to predict the final 
effects of project slippage is limited. 
.. -
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POUl~ S1lo ~11s 
Im,-tuJ.J. Equi.pment 




Figure 3. Typical Milestone Chart 
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TYPICAL 
SYllOOL E.;:!JI . /u lA'rION u~.i1\.GC: t:Xl-'U\i lA''i'I0II 
0 • POl'l::H'l'IAL ::iLIPPAGE, SCHEDULE TAHGE'l' DA'l'E NO KUO\e,'N hl::-SCHI::DUL~ DATE 
• .AC'i'UAL ClJJ•lP.LC:."l'IOIJ • 4 l O'l'J:l'·'°'1'IAL SL.IPPA(l:;, DA'!'£ HE-XI lUJUW 
• 1-0'f.l:l 'i'IAL SLil'l 'AGi:: • ~ JlC'J.'UAL Sl.J.MlJ\GE. I <E-&:l U.:llUJ....:D • • 
• /IC'l'Ul'J. SUPPAGE • l-III.ES·rorn . : COl,!PU:'l'I::l) • FOP.M 'l'AHGE'r Ll/\'.r.L: AF'.cER l.iEil JG HE-SCHE[JlJLlj, l•OUR '1'IJ.lES . MUI fl'HL Y SCHEl)t.JLE:.; • LATE OF COMPLl:.'Tl.()H - CHA!Jc.a.: IUJJICA'lOH OF .BltCKGIDLiND FEJJ 60 I,.:I,W!.:,'lUHt 
Figure 4. Milestone Chart Symbols 
NETWORKING TECHNIQUE 
The networking techniques developed from the basic needs 
for better planning and control of projects. While many 
special names and catch phrases have developed, the two 
original techniques, CPM and PERT, are behind nearly all 
networking as practiced today. 
Critical Path Method (CPM) 
The Critical Path Method was developed in 1957 from a 
basic need to represent job relationships in any project in 
a far more graphic way. Credit for the development of CPM 
is given to Morgan P. Walker (then of DuPont) and James E. 






The new Technique "connected" all jobs as they actually 
existed in a given project, and when time estimates were 
added, allowed for calculation of a minimum expected comple-
tion time and the quantitative identification of critical 
(limited) and slack (excess) resource areas [1,8]. 
The CPM technique achieved national attention, however, 
only after announcements of the development of the PERT 
technique [5,144]. 
Programmed Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) 
To aid in the management of the very complex Polaris 
missile program, the United States Navy created a Special 
Projects Office headed by Admiral William "Red" Raborn. 
Working with personnel of the firm of Boaz, Allen, and Hamil-
ton and Lockheed Missile Systems Division, a networking 
technique was created in 1958 which applied a statistical 
and mathematical approach to the planning, evaluation, and 
control of this Navy project [8, Preface]. 
The PERT technique differed from CPM at the beginning in 
its statistical approach to job time estimating and subsequent 
calculations of probability. This variation was created 
mainly because of the lack of the exact information about 
job duration times in a complex research and development 
program. 
PERT was officially credited with aiding the Navy in 
substantially contracting the overall Polaris project duration 
time and quickly achieved national attention. Interest in 
CPM also increased sharply as project networking began to be 
heralded as a major breakthrough in the field of management 
science [2,1]. 
The basic network used in both the PERT or CPM technique 
can be compared to the milestone chart. As illustrated in 
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Figure 5, the network adds an interconnection from the end 
of one job to the start of the next one in line, thus dis-
playing job dependencies. 
E [SI 'el. ---F [SI Tl:]• ,_. ·--s ... 1-(e}. 
G [S, - e'"' -· •IS eJ 
H KS 'eJ" i---
Figure 5. The Basic Network 
Unfortunately, the milestone chart requires both j ob 
sequencing and time details before it can be drawn. Too 
often the jobs may be forced to fit allotted time. 
By showing the "whole picture" and the interrelationsh i ps 
of assigned tasks, PERT or CPM effect i vely depicts the effects 
of program slippages. 
Perhaps the greatest improvement of the PERT or CPM net-
work over the milestone chart is its ability to show a planned 
sequence before accurate time estimates for jobs are known. 
Job X Job Y Jot, Z 
----© •0~-~~~~->~-·•~@•-----_,{g\..---ActlvlLy Al•ruw · l:."vt:nt ~-







The time period from 1959 through 1962 saw the intro-
duction of a myriad of similar networking techniques under 
almost as many new names. Each had the same basic ones, 
i.e., program planning and control, but utilized variations 
of graphic technique and symbology developed in PERT and CPM. 
These techniques had some initial unfavorable effects 
in that they tended to "split hairs" over methodology, driv-
ing an unnecessary wedge between the original CPM and PERT 
developments. The situation was further complicated by the 
strong advocates of both the CPM and PERT techniques, each 
claiming that their approach was superior to the other. 
Fortunately, as is common to most developments, the 
more practical aspects of each began to be "exchanged" so 
that the various techniques started to converge. The minor 
differences that were created were realized to be more the 
products of need in specific industries rather than "right" 
or "wrong" methodology. 
Today, networking techniques still exist under many names 
with CPM and PERT predominating, but all have undergone some 
changes and the emphasis is now on the goals rather than 
minor technique differences. As Dr . Mauchley recently stated, 
"Nowadays, we are beginning to hear about PERT/Cost and 
job-oriented PERT (as opposed to the original milestone orien-
tation). These modifications bring PERT closer to CPM, a 
trend that can be expected to continue." [2,4] 
Until realistic standards are set, we can always expect 
variations. Improvements should be welcome, but unfortunately, 
most variations are merely arbitrary, and only tend to confuse. 
Some of these variations are depicted in Figure 7 [2,5] . 
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Dozens of minor variations in the two basic network 
techniques have appeared since 1958. PERT and CPM have only 
minor differences; mostly as a result of applications and 
origin. Such differences are illustrated in Figure 8 [2,6]. 
PEH'l' CAwl 
(1 'l'CJgfi.un 1:.:Va 1w liun ru,<l .Rcvit::\'i" (<.:.d tical Pu.th MetJiod) 
1'cct 1n.it4Ut:) .. 
1-'iri:.;t une:d by tllu U. . . .., . Navy Fir:...;t UDed Liy l.Juf'ont for 
on Polari::;. con::; L~tion. 
U,1phas.izcs Acco111plir.;l11uc:mts .l!:iiij.:JlU.Sizes Work Activity 
• 1 I 
JOI.I JUB 0 • 0 . COMPLETED 
Allows Job Uncertuinty to Find Use:; ::iingle 'l'i111e in Estimating 
.I::xpected 'l'inie. Job~. 
6.0 WEEKS+ 6.0 WEEKS - • • 
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F'IW I FED 
STAH'l' STAHT FINISH FIHISll 
12 14 (SLACK) JAN I FEH Ft:B I FEB JOB 12 14 12 15 - 4.2 - COi,iPLl::'i'IW -(1''LOA1') ~
Critical Patil iu ~lvea 'llu--0~ ·1 Cri t.icw. Path is Solve<.1 throltj1 
Sequence of Evt..:nL::; wi ti 1 .Lcust Sequeme o!' J\ctivi ties with Least 
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Figure 8. PERT & CPM Compared 
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The most striking difference between PERT and CPM net· 
works is the graphic expression of activities and events, as 









Figure 9. Major Difference 
Perhaps the most applicable technique would be to combine 
the usefulness of PERT and CPM. Note in Figure 10 that the 
PERT type event is cautiously used only to display overall 
important accomplishments or 11milestonett events [2,7]. 
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To assign responsibility to tasks, the Work Breakdown 
Structure and organizational structure must be related with 
each other; responsibility must be identified at the level 
where performance of work is managed. 
Integration of the Wark Breakdown Structure and the 
organization structure at the cost account level may be 
visualized as a matrix; with the Work Breakdown Structure on 
one axis and the organization structure on the other axis, 
as illustrated in Figure 13 [7,45-46]. 
The Work Breakdown Structure has many of the attributes 
of PERT and CPM, however it does not effectively demonstrate 
the effects of program slippage and is not as dynamic. 
The Work Breakdown Structure is particularly useful in 
defining and monitoring subprojects, which do not necessarily 
lend themselves to PERT or CPM. Furthermore, the Work Break-
down Structure does not require as much skill to develop and 
implement as PERT or CPM. 
Successful application of the Work Breakdown Structure 
is entirely dependent upon the user's skill, judgement, and 
analysis. Because it does not effectively demonstrate the 
effects of program slippage and is not as dynamic as PERT 
and CPM, it is more vulnerable to "tunnel vision." 
Like PERT or CPM, the Work Breakdown Structure is vul-
nerable to consuming a great amount of time and effort on 
the part of the user; thus distorting the project objective 
when too much attention, effort, and misconstrued reports 
are generated to make the Work Breakdown Structure "look good." 
CONCLUSION 
The three principal methods for planning and controlling 
time in a project are: the milestone chart, PERT or CPM, 
and WBS. Each has its applicability depending upon the mag-
nitude and complexity of the project involved. 
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The Network Technique Applied 
On 27 July 1964, Admiral Raborn stated in his letter 
11 I am sure that the PERT technique can be used most intelli-
gently and effectively on many, many endeavors, provided of 
course, that one does not try to get too sophisticated 
about it." [2,1) 
Successful application of the network technique is entire-
ly dependent on the user's skill, judgement, and analysis. 
If not properly implemented, the network technique could be-
come more of a burden to project performance than aid . In 
implementing the network technique, the user is vulnerable 
to "tunnel vision", though perhaps less vulnerable than 
most other techniques, due to the user's ability to see the 
"whole picture", the interrelationships of assigned tasks, 
and the effects of program slippages. 
The network technique is vulnerable to consuming a great 
amount of time and effort on the part of the user. Because 
the project is being evaluated by PERT/CPM, there is a great 
temptation to "make PERT/CPM look good" with distorted reports, 
and the consumption of a great amount of time and effort. 
THE WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE (WBS) 
Under the Work Breakdown Structure, work is defined by 
breaking the job down into its component tasks and subtasks, 
which are scheduled, and budgets allocated, as illustrated 
in Figure 12 [6,194). 
Under this concept, work is planned by providing a basic 
structure of work increments. These work increments or tasks 
provide the basis for work authorization, budgeting, and 
master scheduling. As each task is defined and planned in 
more detail, it is divided into subtasks and responsibility 
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Figure 13. Integration of WBS and Organizational Structure 







The milestone chart is effective in planning and control-
ling repetitive work and small, simple projects. It can be 
dangerous when applied to large, complex projects because it 
does not show the "whole picture" of the project, nor the 
interrelations of the various tasks, nor the effects of pro-
gram slippage. 
For planning and controlling time in either medium or 
large, complex jobs, either PERT, CPM, or WBS is preferred. 
PERT, CPM, and WBS require much more skill to develop and 
implement than the milestone chart. Successful development 
and implementation of these methods is entirely dependent 
upon the skill, judgement, and analysis of the user. 
PERT and CPM have the advantage over the WBS in readily 
depicting the effects of program slippage and in being dynam-
ic. PERT and CPM assumes conditions change during the life 
of the project, and is a continuing cycle of revision and 
review. The actual completion of activities may alter esti-
mates of work to come; parts of the original plan may be 
discarded. As variables in the plan change, new data is 
prepared and new reports written; often with the aid of com-
puters. As a general rule for PERT and CPM, projects consisting 
of over two hundred tasks should be implemented on a computer; 
standard software programs and their instruction manuals are 
readily available for PERT or CPM. Projects consisting of 
less than two hundred tasks should be implemented manually 
[1, Preface]. 
The Work Breakdown Structure is particularly useful in 
defining and monitoring subprojects, which do not necessarily 
lend themselves to PERT or CPM. Furthermore, WBS does not 
require the skill to develop and implement as does PERT or 
CPM. 
Approximately six months should be provided for adequate 
planning and controlling of time in a project before the 
project begins. The extent of time and planning is dependent 
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upon the nature of the work. Production oriented activities 
are normally planned considerably longer than six months in 
the future, whereas some development projects are less read-
ily defined, and consequently planning may be less than six 
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